FAMILY COURT FRAUD

Vesselin Mitev
New York Law Journal
May 05, 2009

A Long Island, N.Y., matrimonial attorney who did not bill her client at the requisite 60-day intervals cannot collect claimed legal fees, a New York state judge has ruled.

Attorney Charlene K. Verkowitz, appearing pro se, argued that she had substantially complied with rules requiring matrimonial lawyers to provide written, itemized bills at least every 60 days.

But New York Supreme Court Justice William R. LaMarca of Nassau County disagreed, noting in Verkowitz v. Torres, 17206/06, that since Verkowitz had not "follow[ed] the rules," she had to forfeit her fees.

Verkowitz, of New Hyde Park, N.Y., was hired by Ernest Torres on Nov. 7, 2002, to represent him in a Suffolk County Family Court support hearing. That day, Torres signed a retainer and paid a $3,500 fee, according to the decision.

The next month, Torres retained Verkowitz to represent him in a separate matrimonial action. Unused portions of his previous retainer were credited to the matrimonial bill, and Torres paid an additional $3,500.

On July 14, 2003, Torres relieved Verkowitz as counsel, prompting the subsequent suit over $7,915 in counsel fees plus costs, according to the decision.

During the eight-month period from initial retainer to her discharge, Verkowitz sent four bills to Torres: on Dec. 6, 2002; Feb. 3, 2003; June 17, 2003; and Nov. 5, 2003.

The Feb. 3, 2003, bill showed a credit balance of $2,309 but more than 120 days had elapsed between the February bill and the June 17 bill. Her lawsuit only covered fees mentioned in the first three bills.

At trial in December 2008, Verkowitz testified that between the second and third billing cycle she "continually advised" Torres that his retainer had been exhausted. Torres was "often" in her office during this time reviewing his case, according to the decision.

Torres denied he was told about the bills and claimed he told Verkowitz about his "dire financial straits," which were also the subject of a motion to modify a separation agreement with his wife, Justice LaMarca wrote.

According to Michael R. Walker, Torres' attorney, his client had limited funds, as evidenced by the fact he charged the first two retainers on his girlfriend's credit card.

Under 22 NYCRR 1400.3, a retainer agreement sets forth the "[f]requency of itemized billing, which shall be at least every 60 days; the client may not be charged for time spent in discussion of the bills received."

Here, LaMarca wrote, "there is no doubt that Verkowitz did not abide by the rules, in that she did not provide written itemized bills at least every 60 days."

The failure to comply with the rules "promulgated to address abuses in the practice of matrimonial law and to protect the public will result in preclusion from recovering such legal fees," the judge continued, quoting Julien v. Machson, 245 AD2d 122.

Verkowitz cited, among other cases, Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 285 AD2d 587, and Sherman v. Sherman, 34 AD3d 670, which set forth that attorney fees may be recovered if there is "substantial compliance" with 22 NYCRR 1400.3.

However, LaMarca distinguished those cases as addressing the recovery of legal fees from an adversary spouse, observing "[t]hat is not this case."

"In all cases cited by Verkowitz, the courts recited the law ... that attorneys must follow the rules or forfeit legal fees," the judge held. "There is no doubt that the third bill ... was not sent within 60 days as mandated."

Although he held that Verkowitz did not substantially comply with the rules, LaMarca did not order her to return the $2,309 credit indicated on the second bill, citing Mulcahy for the proposition that "a court need not direct the return of a retainer fee already paid for properly-earned services."

In an interview, Walker said his client's case was factually different than that of a Brooklyn accountant who earlier this year was ordered to pay his attorney fees despite a 17-month billing delay.

In Edelstein v. Greisman, 18848/08, attorney Saul Edelstein had won at the arbitration level before Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Mark I. Partnow upheld his award.

Here, Verkowitz had lost in arbitration, Walker said.

LaMarca properly interpreted the statute, said Walker, of Gallagher, Walker, Bianco & Plastaras in Mineola, N.Y. "We have strict rules precisely for this reason."

In an interview, Verkowitz said she "respectfully disagree[d] with the judge's interpretation of substantial compliance."

She said the initial arbitration award was "100 percent" in her favor but had been overturned by a "technicality," prompting a rehearing which she lost.

LaMarca's decision did not mention the arbitration.

http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/CareerCenterArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202430444547

Vesselin Mitev
New York Law Journal
May 05, 2009

A Long Island, N.Y., matrimonial attorney who did not bill her client at the requisite 60-day intervals cannot collect claimed legal fees, a New York state judge has ruled.

Attorney Charlene K. Verkowitz, appearing pro se, argued that she had substantially complied with rules requiring matrimonial lawyers to provide written, itemized bills at least every 60 days.

But New York Supreme Court Justice William R. LaMarca of Nassau County disagreed, noting in Verkowitz v. Torres, 17206/06, that since Verkowitz had not "follow[ed] the rules," she had to forfeit her fees.

Verkowitz, of New Hyde Park, N.Y., was hired by Ernest Torres on Nov. 7, 2002, to represent him in a Suffolk County Family Court support hearing. That day, Torres signed a retainer and paid a $3,500 fee, according to the decision.

The next month, Torres retained Verkowitz to represent him in a separate matrimonial action. Unused portions of his previous retainer were credited to the matrimonial bill, and Torres paid an additional $3,500.

On July 14, 2003, Torres relieved Verkowitz as counsel, prompting the subsequent suit over $7,915 in counsel fees plus costs, according to the decision.

During the eight-month period from initial retainer to her discharge, Verkowitz sent four bills to Torres: on Dec. 6, 2002; Feb. 3, 2003; June 17, 2003; and Nov. 5, 2003.

The Feb. 3, 2003, bill showed a credit balance of $2,309 but more than 120 days had elapsed between the February bill and the June 17 bill. Her lawsuit only covered fees mentioned in the first three bills.

At trial in December 2008, Verkowitz testified that between the second and third billing cycle she "continually advised" Torres that his retainer had been exhausted. Torres was "often" in her office during this time reviewing his case, according to the decision.

Torres denied he was told about the bills and claimed he told Verkowitz about his "dire financial straits," which were also the subject of a motion to modify a separation agreement with his wife, Justice LaMarca wrote.

According to Michael R. Walker, Torres' attorney, his client had limited funds, as evidenced by the fact he charged the first two retainers on his girlfriend's credit card.

Under 22 NYCRR 1400.3, a retainer agreement sets forth the "[f]requency of itemized billing, which shall be at least every 60 days; the client may not be charged for time spent in discussion of the bills received."

Here, LaMarca wrote, "there is no doubt that Verkowitz did not abide by the rules, in that she did not provide written itemized bills at least every 60 days."

The failure to comply with the rules "promulgated to address abuses in the practice of matrimonial law and to protect the public will result in preclusion from recovering such legal fees," the judge continued, quoting Julien v. Machson, 245 AD2d 122.

Verkowitz cited, among other cases, Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 285 AD2d 587, and Sherman v. Sherman, 34 AD3d 670, which set forth that attorney fees may be recovered if there is "substantial compliance" with 22 NYCRR 1400.3.

However, LaMarca distinguished those cases as addressing the recovery of legal fees from an adversary spouse, observing "[t]hat is not this case."

"In all cases cited by Verkowitz, the courts recited the law ... that attorneys must follow the rules or forfeit legal fees," the judge held. "There is no doubt that the third bill ... was not sent within 60 days as mandated."

Although he held that Verkowitz did not substantially comply with the rules, LaMarca did not order her to return the $2,309 credit indicated on the second bill, citing Mulcahy for the proposition that "a court need not direct the return of a retainer fee already paid for properly-earned services."

In an interview, Walker said his client's case was factually different than that of a Brooklyn accountant who earlier this year was ordered to pay his attorney fees despite a 17-month billing delay.

In Edelstein v. Greisman, 18848/08, attorney Saul Edelstein had won at the arbitration level before Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Mark I. Partnow upheld his award.

Here, Verkowitz had lost in arbitration, Walker said.

LaMarca properly interpreted the statute, said Walker, of Gallagher, Walker, Bianco & Plastaras in Mineola, N.Y. "We have strict rules precisely for this reason."

In an interview, Verkowitz said she "respectfully disagree[d] with the judge's interpretation of substantial compliance."

She said the initial arbitration award was "100 percent" in her favor but had been overturned by a "technicality," prompting a rehearing which she lost.

LaMarca's decision did not mention the arbitration.

http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/CareerCenterArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202430444547

Posted: May 6, 2009 10:36 PM

By DANNY ROBBINS, AP
posted: 48 MINUTES AGOcomments: 0filed under: National News

DALLAS (March 19) — The Dallas school system was rocked by allegations Thursday that staff members at an inner-city high school made students settle their differences by fighting bare-knuckle brawls inside a steel cage.
The principal and other employees at South Oak Cliff High knew about the cage fights and allowed the practice to continue, according to a 2008 report by school system investigators.

"More than anything, I'm in shock and disbelief — shocked that this could ever occur and shocked that it would be condoned by a professional administrator," said Jerome Garza, a member of the Dallas school board.
The report, first obtained by The Dallas Morning News, describes two instances of fighting in an equipment cage in a boys' locker room between 2003 and 2005. It was not clear from the report whether there were other fights.
Superintendent Michael Hinojosa told the newspaper that there were "some things that happened inside of a cage" and called the fights "unacceptable."
No criminal charges were ever filed, and there was no mention in the report of whether anyone required medical attention or whether any employees were disciplined. A district spokesman would not comment.
The allegations came to light during a grade-fixing investigation that eventually cost the high school its 2005 and 2006 state basketball titles. School officials were suspected of altering students' grades so that they could remain eligible to play for South Oak Cliff, a perennial basketball powerhouse in one of the poorer sections of the city.
The newspaper reported Thursday that Angela Williamson, a parent, said she was ignored when she attempted to bring the matter to the attention of district administrators after her son, Cortland, told her that students stood around clapping and screaming while watching a fight he participated in. He and another student fought for five to ten minutes in the cage in 2004. She said the students acted as if they were in an arena.

Williamson said she took her son out of the school and moved to another district shortly after he came home with a swollen hand.
"I said enough is enough, and we just left," she said. "This was the norm. My son said this is what they do — let them fight in 'the cage.'"
She said she met with a football coach who had encouraged the fights.
"He told me this is how they settled disputes in his day," she said.
In an interview with the Morning News, Donald Moten, who retired as principal last year, denied any fights were held.
"That's barbaric. You can't do that at a high school. You can't do that anywhere," Moten said. "Ain't nothing to comment on. It never did happen. I never put a stop to anything because it never happened."
In the report, a teacher was quoted as saying Moten told security personnel to put two fighting students "in the cage and let 'em duke it out."
The report said a hall monitor, Gary King, told investigators he witnessed the head of campus security and an assistant basketball coach place two students in the cage to fight.
Another hall monitor, Reno Savala, told investigators he came upon two students fighting in the cage "bare-fisted with no head or eye protection." Savala said the assistant coach was watching the fight and broke it up when Savala told him to.
"It was gladiator-style entertainment for the staff," Frank Hammond, a fired counselor who has filed a whistle-blower lawsuit against the district, told the newspaper. "They were taking these boys downstairs to fight. And it was sanctioned by the principal and security."
Hammond did not actually witness any of the fights, according to the report.

Garza, the school board member, said the board should look into whether criminal charges should be filed.
Dallas police said they have no record of any investigation by the department. The district attorney's office would not comment.
The allegations come about 10 days after law enforcement authorities reported that workers at a Corpus Christi institution forced mentally disabled residents to fight each other and recorded the brawls for their entertainment.

Associated Press Writer Jeff Carlton contributed to this report.
http://news.aol.com/article/high-school-cage-fight/390108

http://www.pro-selaw.org/pro-selaw/index.asp

This website is designed as a resource center on self-representation in civil legal matters. Our purpose is to provide a collection of materials and resources that can be used to create legal service delivery systems that are based on the concept of "pro se" or "self" representation within federally funded legal services programs, courts, pro bono programs, and other community-based programs.
Pro Se means "on one's own behalf."  A 1991 American Bar Association study of self-represented litigants showed:

• Persons with incomes less than $50,000 are more likely to represent themselves.
• About 20% of self-represented litigants report they can afford an attorney but do not want one.
• Self-represented persons are more likely to be satisfied with the judicial process than those who are represented by attorneys.
• Almost 75% of those who represented themselves in court said they would do it again.

Self-representation, when combined with the power of modern information technology can be an important means of providing increased access to the legal system.
This resource center contains:

• A searchable Directory of Pro Se Programs operated by legal service providers;

• White papers and research on the research concept;

• A Discussion space where organizations that want to design and operate pro se assistance programs can post questions and receive answers from other
  professionals who are engaged in operating pro se programs.

www.stopfamilyviolence.org/349
by Sarah Childress