Incident Appears to be Murder-Suicide
Updated: Monday, 03 Aug 2009, 10:18 AM CDT
Published : Sunday, 02 Aug 2009, 10:09 PM CDT
Dyersburg, Tenn. - Three people are dead in Dyersburg after a father accused of child abuse apparently shot and killed his daughter and one of her protective custodians, then turned the gun on himself.
According to Capt. Steve Isbell with Dyersburg Police, officers were called to the 800-block of Blake Cove just after 7:30pm Sunday.
46-year old Todd Randolph, his wife 45-year old Susan Randolph and a 15-year old girl were found with gunshot wounds. Todd Randolph and the teenage girl were pronounced dead at the scene. Susan Randolph was airlifted to The Med and was released Monday morning.
Investigators determined that the teen's father, 34-year old Christopher Milburn, approached the Randolph home and opened fire. Milburn was found dead about a block away with a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
Dyersburg Police and the Department of Children Services had launched an investigation into allegations of abuse last week involving Christopher Milburn and his 15 year old daughter. Department of Children Services had placed the 15 year old into the care of the Randolph family pending the outcome of the investigation.
http://www.myfoxmemphis.com/dpp/news/tennessee/080209_Three_Dead_in_Dyersburg_Shooting
Girl, 7, in a coma may not survive.
By Jason Bergreen
The Salt Lake Tribune
Updated: 07/28/2009 10:47:12 AM MDT
Emperatriz
Meza-Reyna A 7-year-old girl is in a coma with critical head injuries
just months after state foster care workers returned her to her mother,
who was convicted last year of child abuse.
Now the 21-year-old mother is once again in jail on suspicion of beating the child, who may not survive.
Emperatriz Meza-Reyna took her daughter to Pioneer Valley Hospital on July 22 with a head injury, bruises on her body and a bite mark, West Valley City police Capt. Tom McLachlan said.
During the examination, the girl went into cardiac arrest and was flown to Primary Children's Medical Center. There, she underwent brain surgery and remains in a coma in critical condition.
Meza-Reyna told police her daughter fell down stairs, but doctors say her injuries are not consistent with a fall.
McLachlan said the girl's injuries appear to be caused by being hit with a hard object or slammed into a floor, wall or another hard surface.
Meza-Reyna has two other children who don't appear to have been abused, police said. But the mother was arrested in January 2008 on suspicion of child abuse involving the same child. She pleaded guilty to two charges of third-degree felony child abuse.
According to those charges, Meza-Reyna admitted to strangling the child and covering her mouth and nose multiple times, beating her with a belt and a cable cord and writing on the child with a black marker, injuring the child's face. A doctor in that case said the
child had bruises and marks all over her body. The doctor also said there was evidence of a head injury, including soft-tissue swelling and bleeding on the brain.
Meza-Reyna was sentenced in January; all prison time was suspended. She served 17 days in jail and was given 36 months of probation.
McLachlan said the Division of Child and Family Services had custody of the girl for a period of time before she was returned to her mother several months ago.
Meza-Reyna has an immigration detainer against her, which means she will be deported once the case ends and she is released to federal authorities.
DCFS spokeswoman Liz Sollis would not comment on the case. She said DCFS in general usually works with other health, school and law enforcement professionals to determine the best interest of the child involved in an abusive situation. The parent, if they have been convicted of child abuse, is usually required to complete court imposed programs and classes before a judge determines when the child may return home.
McLachlan said Meza-Reyna and her children recently lived with another adult, but their relationship is unknown. He said the man is not a suspect in the new case.
Meza-Reyna was booked into the Salt Lake County jail Thursday on suspicion of child abuse. She is being held on $50,000 bail
A
acquit - To find a defendant not guilty in a criminal trial.
adjudication - A judgment or decree.
affidavit - A written or printed declaration or statement under oath.
appeal - Review of a case by a higher court.
appellant - Party appealing a decision or judgment to a higher court.
appellee - The party against whom an appeal is filed.
B
bench trial - Trial held before judge sitting without a jury; jury waived trial.
C
caseload - The number of cases a judge handles.
cause of action - A legal claim.
certiorari - A procedure for removing a case from a lower court to a higher court for review.
change of venue - Moving a case from one court, or location, to another.
civil law - All law that is not criminal law.
code - A collection of laws promulgated by legislative authority.
common law - A system of jurisprudence based on precedent rather than statutory laws.
D
de novo - “Anew.” A trial de novo is a completely new trial.
declaratory judgment - A judgment declaring the rights of the parties on a question of law.
defendant - A person charged with a crime or a person against whom a civil action is brought.
deposition - Sworn testimony taken outside the courtroom according to the rules of the court.
docket - Book containing entries of all proceedings in a court.
double jeopardy - Prohibition against more than one prosecution for the same crime.
due process - Constitutional guarantee that an accused person receives a fair and impartial trial.
E
en banc - “On the bench.” All judges of a court sitting together to hear a case.
et al. - Abbreviation of the Latin "et alter", meaning: “and others.”
F
felony - A serious criminal offense for which the minimum sentence is one year.
G
H
I
indictment - Written accusation of a grand jury charging a crime.
injunction - Court orders prohibiting specific actions from being carried out.
interrogatories - Written questions which must be answered under oath.
J
judgment - Final determination by a court.
judgment document - Document that explains the sentence an offender receives from a trial court.
jurisprudence - The science of law.
L
limited jurisdiction - Courts limited in the types of criminal and civil cases they may hear.
litigant - Person or group engaged in a lawsuit.
M
moot - Unsettled or undecided.
N
negligence - The absence of ordinary care.
O
P
probate - The legal process of establishing the validity of a will and settling an estate.
pro bono - Legal services provided without attorney fees.
pro se - Legal representation of oneself
R
recess - A short interval during which court suspends business, but without adjourning.
S
sentence, concurrent - Two or more sentences which run at the same time.
sentence, consecutive - Two or more sentences which run one after another.
sentence, determinate - A sentence that states exactly the time to be served or money to be paid.
statute - A law created by the Legislature.
stay - Halting a judicial proceeding by order of the court.
T
tort - An injury or wrong committed with or without force to the person or property of another giving rise to a claim for damages.
V
venue - The specific county, city or geographical area in which a court has jurisdiction.
W
A
acquit - To find a defendant not guilty in a criminal trial.
adjudication - A judgment or decree.
affidavit - A written or printed declaration or statement under oath.
appeal - Review of a case by a higher court.
appellant - Party appealing a decision or judgment to a higher court.
appellee - The party against whom an appeal is filed.
B
bench trial - Trial held before judge sitting without a jury; jury waived trial.
C
caseload - The number of cases a judge handles.
cause of action - A legal claim.
certiorari - A procedure for removing a case from a lower court to a higher court for review.
change of venue - Moving a case from one court, or location, to another.
civil law - All law that is not criminal law.
code - A collection of laws promulgated by legislative authority.
common law - A system of jurisprudence based on precedent rather than statutory laws.
D
de novo - “Anew.” A trial de novo is a completely new trial.
declaratory judgment - A judgment declaring the rights of the parties on a question of law.
defendant - A person charged with a crime or a person against whom a civil action is brought.
deposition - Sworn testimony taken outside the courtroom according to the rules of the court.
docket - Book containing entries of all proceedings in a court.
double jeopardy - Prohibition against more than one prosecution for the same crime.
due process - Constitutional guarantee that an accused person receives a fair and impartial trial.
E
en banc - “On the bench.” All judges of a court sitting together to hear a case.
et al. - Abbreviation of the Latin "et alter", meaning: “and others.”
F
felony - A serious criminal offense for which the minimum sentence is one year.
G
H
I
indictment - Written accusation of a grand jury charging a crime.
injunction - Court orders prohibiting specific actions from being carried out.
interrogatories - Written questions which must be answered under oath.
J
judgment - Final determination by a court.
judgment document - Document that explains the sentence an offender receives from a trial court.
jurisprudence - The science of law.
L
limited jurisdiction - Courts limited in the types of criminal and civil cases they may hear.
litigant - Person or group engaged in a lawsuit.
M
moot - Unsettled or undecided.
N
negligence - The absence of ordinary care.
O
P
probate - The legal process of establishing the validity of a will and settling an estate.
pro bono - Legal services provided without attorney fees.
pro se - Legal representation of oneself
R
recess - A short interval during which court suspends business, but without adjourning.
S
sentence, concurrent - Two or more sentences which run at the same time.
sentence, consecutive - Two or more sentences which run one after another.
sentence, determinate - A sentence that states exactly the time to be served or money to be paid.
statute - A law created by the Legislature.
stay - Halting a judicial proceeding by order of the court.
T
tort - An injury or wrong committed with or without force to the person or property of another giving rise to a claim for damages.
V
venue - The specific county, city or geographical area in which a court has jurisdiction.
W
Have you ever called a government agency for help only to be chuckled at and made fun of? Then chances are you have never had to contact the Cocke County Department of Children Services (DCS) located on Heritage Street in Newport, Tennessee.
Such was the case on Monday, July 6, when Renée Lynn, Editor-in-Chief of “The Knoxville Journal,” needed to discuss a dire situation with Kim Ramsey, a case worker at the Cocke County DCS. Mrs. Lynn tried numerous times to reach Ms. Ramsey or anyone in the department to no avail.
Finally, Mrs. Lynn got in touch with Ms. Ramsey to converse about a very serious issue concerning information relevant to two foster children under their jurisdiction. Apparently the information was ignored.
When asked very pertinent questions about the care of these children, Ms. Ramsey began laughing over the phone along with other employees. They just kept on laughing. Ms. Ramsey made no effort to correct her rude behavior with an apology. Mrs. Lynn then informed Ms. Ramsey that this was not a laughing matter, but was a grave set of circumstances. Again Mrs. Lynn was met with snickering.
It just so happened that Mrs. Lynn’s telephone was on speaker phone and at least one other person witnessed the outrageous behavior of Ms. Ramsey.
Mrs. Lynn commented, “It is a sad day when upstanding citizens are being subjected to such disrespect from government employees.”
This is not the first complaint lodged against the Cocke County DCS. This reporter knows of at least one other incident in which the Cocke County office has overstepped their bounds.
Ms. Vicki Hodge, supervisor of the Cocke County DCS did return a call to Mrs. Lynn on Tuesday, July 7, but did not apologize for the offensive conduct of her employees.
If you have any information about the Cocke County DCS you would like to share, please call Myra Wheeler at The Knoxville Journal at (865) 546-5353.
http://www.theknoxvillejournal.com/inside/pages/news/Cocke-County-DCS.html
I am sure they would be interested in all the stories in TN, give it a shot.
Vesselin Mitev
New York Law Journal
May 05, 2009
A Long Island, N.Y., matrimonial attorney who did not bill her client at the requisite 60-day intervals cannot collect claimed legal fees, a New York state judge has ruled.
Attorney Charlene K. Verkowitz, appearing pro se, argued that she had substantially complied with rules requiring matrimonial lawyers to provide written, itemized bills at least every 60 days.
But New York Supreme Court Justice William R. LaMarca of Nassau County disagreed, noting in Verkowitz v. Torres, 17206/06, that since Verkowitz had not "follow[ed] the rules," she had to forfeit her fees.
Verkowitz, of New Hyde Park, N.Y., was hired by Ernest Torres on Nov. 7, 2002, to represent him in a Suffolk County Family Court support hearing. That day, Torres signed a retainer and paid a $3,500 fee, according to the decision.
The next month, Torres retained Verkowitz to represent him in a separate matrimonial action. Unused portions of his previous retainer were credited to the matrimonial bill, and Torres paid an additional $3,500.
On July 14, 2003, Torres relieved Verkowitz as counsel, prompting the subsequent suit over $7,915 in counsel fees plus costs, according to the decision.
During the eight-month period from initial retainer to her discharge, Verkowitz sent four bills to Torres: on Dec. 6, 2002; Feb. 3, 2003; June 17, 2003; and Nov. 5, 2003.
The Feb. 3, 2003, bill showed a credit balance of $2,309 but more than 120 days had elapsed between the February bill and the June 17 bill. Her lawsuit only covered fees mentioned in the first three bills.
At trial in December 2008, Verkowitz testified that between the second and third billing cycle she "continually advised" Torres that his retainer had been exhausted. Torres was "often" in her office during this time reviewing his case, according to the decision.
Torres denied he was told about the bills and claimed he told Verkowitz about his "dire financial straits," which were also the subject of a motion to modify a separation agreement with his wife, Justice LaMarca wrote.
According to Michael R. Walker, Torres' attorney, his client had limited funds, as evidenced by the fact he charged the first two retainers on his girlfriend's credit card.
Under 22 NYCRR 1400.3, a retainer agreement sets forth the "[f]requency of itemized billing, which shall be at least every 60 days; the client may not be charged for time spent in discussion of the bills received."
Here, LaMarca wrote, "there is no doubt that Verkowitz did not abide by the rules, in that she did not provide written itemized bills at least every 60 days."
The failure to comply with the rules "promulgated to address abuses in the practice of matrimonial law and to protect the public will result in preclusion from recovering such legal fees," the judge continued, quoting Julien v. Machson, 245 AD2d 122.
Verkowitz cited, among other cases, Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 285 AD2d 587, and Sherman v. Sherman, 34 AD3d 670, which set forth that attorney fees may be recovered if there is "substantial compliance" with 22 NYCRR 1400.3.
However, LaMarca distinguished those cases as addressing the recovery of legal fees from an adversary spouse, observing "[t]hat is not this case."
"In all cases cited by Verkowitz, the courts recited the law ... that attorneys must follow the rules or forfeit legal fees," the judge held. "There is no doubt that the third bill ... was not sent within 60 days as mandated."
Although he held that Verkowitz did not substantially comply with the rules, LaMarca did not order her to return the $2,309 credit indicated on the second bill, citing Mulcahy for the proposition that "a court need not direct the return of a retainer fee already paid for properly-earned services."
In an interview, Walker said his client's case was factually different than that of a Brooklyn accountant who earlier this year was ordered to pay his attorney fees despite a 17-month billing delay.
In Edelstein v. Greisman, 18848/08, attorney Saul Edelstein had won at the arbitration level before Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Mark I. Partnow upheld his award.
Here, Verkowitz had lost in arbitration, Walker said.
LaMarca properly interpreted the statute, said Walker, of Gallagher, Walker, Bianco & Plastaras in Mineola, N.Y. "We have strict rules precisely for this reason."
In an interview, Verkowitz said she "respectfully disagree[d] with the judge's interpretation of substantial compliance."
She said the initial arbitration award was "100 percent" in her favor but had been overturned by a "technicality," prompting a rehearing which she lost.
LaMarca's decision did not mention the arbitration.
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/CareerCenterArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202430444547
Vesselin Mitev
New York Law Journal
May 05, 2009
A Long Island, N.Y., matrimonial attorney who did not bill her client at the requisite 60-day intervals cannot collect claimed legal fees, a New York state judge has ruled.
Attorney Charlene K. Verkowitz, appearing pro se, argued that she had substantially complied with rules requiring matrimonial lawyers to provide written, itemized bills at least every 60 days.
But New York Supreme Court Justice William R. LaMarca of Nassau County disagreed, noting in Verkowitz v. Torres, 17206/06, that since Verkowitz had not "follow[ed] the rules," she had to forfeit her fees.
Verkowitz, of New Hyde Park, N.Y., was hired by Ernest Torres on Nov. 7, 2002, to represent him in a Suffolk County Family Court support hearing. That day, Torres signed a retainer and paid a $3,500 fee, according to the decision.
The next month, Torres retained Verkowitz to represent him in a separate matrimonial action. Unused portions of his previous retainer were credited to the matrimonial bill, and Torres paid an additional $3,500.
On July 14, 2003, Torres relieved Verkowitz as counsel, prompting the subsequent suit over $7,915 in counsel fees plus costs, according to the decision.
During the eight-month period from initial retainer to her discharge, Verkowitz sent four bills to Torres: on Dec. 6, 2002; Feb. 3, 2003; June 17, 2003; and Nov. 5, 2003.
The Feb. 3, 2003, bill showed a credit balance of $2,309 but more than 120 days had elapsed between the February bill and the June 17 bill. Her lawsuit only covered fees mentioned in the first three bills.
At trial in December 2008, Verkowitz testified that between the second and third billing cycle she "continually advised" Torres that his retainer had been exhausted. Torres was "often" in her office during this time reviewing his case, according to the decision.
Torres denied he was told about the bills and claimed he told Verkowitz about his "dire financial straits," which were also the subject of a motion to modify a separation agreement with his wife, Justice LaMarca wrote.
According to Michael R. Walker, Torres' attorney, his client had limited funds, as evidenced by the fact he charged the first two retainers on his girlfriend's credit card.
Under 22 NYCRR 1400.3, a retainer agreement sets forth the "[f]requency of itemized billing, which shall be at least every 60 days; the client may not be charged for time spent in discussion of the bills received."
Here, LaMarca wrote, "there is no doubt that Verkowitz did not abide by the rules, in that she did not provide written itemized bills at least every 60 days."
The failure to comply with the rules "promulgated to address abuses in the practice of matrimonial law and to protect the public will result in preclusion from recovering such legal fees," the judge continued, quoting Julien v. Machson, 245 AD2d 122.
Verkowitz cited, among other cases, Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 285 AD2d 587, and Sherman v. Sherman, 34 AD3d 670, which set forth that attorney fees may be recovered if there is "substantial compliance" with 22 NYCRR 1400.3.
However, LaMarca distinguished those cases as addressing the recovery of legal fees from an adversary spouse, observing "[t]hat is not this case."
"In all cases cited by Verkowitz, the courts recited the law ... that attorneys must follow the rules or forfeit legal fees," the judge held. "There is no doubt that the third bill ... was not sent within 60 days as mandated."
Although he held that Verkowitz did not substantially comply with the rules, LaMarca did not order her to return the $2,309 credit indicated on the second bill, citing Mulcahy for the proposition that "a court need not direct the return of a retainer fee already paid for properly-earned services."
In an interview, Walker said his client's case was factually different than that of a Brooklyn accountant who earlier this year was ordered to pay his attorney fees despite a 17-month billing delay.
In Edelstein v. Greisman, 18848/08, attorney Saul Edelstein had won at the arbitration level before Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Mark I. Partnow upheld his award.
Here, Verkowitz had lost in arbitration, Walker said.
LaMarca properly interpreted the statute, said Walker, of Gallagher, Walker, Bianco & Plastaras in Mineola, N.Y. "We have strict rules precisely for this reason."
In an interview, Verkowitz said she "respectfully disagree[d] with the judge's interpretation of substantial compliance."
She said the initial arbitration award was "100 percent" in her favor but had been overturned by a "technicality," prompting a rehearing which she lost.
LaMarca's decision did not mention the arbitration.
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/CareerCenterArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202430444547
| Judge to day care worker: Say you're sorry |  |
 |
| Wednesday, 13 May 2009 | |
|
The former lead day-care worker at a Sun Prairie, Wisconsin day care center has been given probation for squeezing an 18-month old until she stopped breathing, according to the Wisconsin State Journal. Dane County Circuit Judge Patrick Fiedler gave Sara Kladenhall 5 years to "prove... she was sincere when she said she was sorry for what happened," reports the paper.The child was revived by a co-worker and has since recovered. Co-worker Lindsay Anderson, charged with child neglect for helping to hold the child down, was placed in a first offenders program. The State Journal says that following that sentencing, Anderson was charged with domestic disorderly conduct in another case and dropped from the first offenders program. On May 7, she pleaded guilty to the disorderly conduct charges and was placed, again, in the first offenders program. For a second time. |
Posted: May 6, 2009 10:36 PM
By SHELBY BAKER
6 News Reporter
KNOXVILLE (WATE) -- There are currently five Knox County teachers on administrative leave. Most of them are facing allegations of inappropriate conduct with a student.
Ken Davis, a Halls High School teacher, was placed on administrative leave with pay on April 1, 2009. He is accused of inappropriate conduct with students.
Paula Gumpman, a teacher at Eastport Elementary School, was placed on leave with pay in April 27, 2009 for allegations of physical contact with a student.
Danny Sanders, a Carter High School teacher, was put on leave with pay September 12, 2008 for neglect of duty. He was moved to 20 days of leave without pay beginning last month.
Julia Detiveaux, an employee at Sam E. Hill Family and Community Center, was placed on leave in April for allegations of failing to properly supervise a student.
Knox County says the length of time a teacher is on administrative leave varies, depending on the circumstances.
Employees are placed on leave with pay while allegations are investigated. Based on the outcome, the superintendent determines if the pay status changes.
Also, Corey DeHart, a Halls High School math teacher who was accused of statutory rape of a female student last year, now has 30 days to request a hearing.
A judge dismissed the charges against DeHart in November 2008.
But Wednesday night, school board members decided if the charges are true, there would be reason to revoke his tenure.
"There are different standards between judicial matters and employment matters and different standards for convicting someone of a crime versus taking employment action, so we believe that the charges speak for themselves," said Superintendent of Knox County Schools Jim MvIntyre.
The school board says if Corey DeHart doesn't request a hearing in 30 days, his tenure will be automatically revoked.
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